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UNDERCOVER MARKETING: IF OMISSION IS THE 
MISSION, WHERE IS THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION? 
Brooke E. Crescenti* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1915, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was organized 
as an independent federal administrative agency pursuant to the 
congressional mandate set forth in the Federal Trade Commission 
Act of 1914 (FTC Act).1 The FTC is granted the authority to 
investigate, prevent, and prosecute unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce, including cases of false 
advertising and unsubstantiated product claims.2 However, in spite 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; B.S. New York University, 2003. 
The author wishes to thank her parents for their constant love and faith. She 
would also like to thank the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their 
assistance and hard work. Special thanks to her family and J.P., R.Z. and S.M. 
for their encouragement and to J.G. for his patience and support. 
1 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2003). 
2 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1938). With regard to the administration and 
enforcement of the FTC Act, if the FTC has reason to believe that a violation 
has occurred of any of the proscriptions in the Act against unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce or unfair methods of competition in 
and affecting commerce, it may issue a complaint setting forth the 
Commission’s charges. Once the complaint is served on the individual or 
business entity, the FTC will hold a hearing. Id. If, after the hearing, the FTC 
believes that the individual or business entity indeed engaged in deceptive acts 
or practices, it may issue a cease and desist order against the practice. Id. The 
federal courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to FTC 
cease and desist orders. Id. § 45(d). The findings of fact, if supported by 
evidence, are conclusive on appeal. Id. § 45(c). Violations of final orders, 
whether adjudged by the FTC or the courts of appeals, result in civil penalty 
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of the FTC’s authority to investigate deceptive acts and its 
requirement that advertisers disclose material connections between 
product endorsers and the companies selling the endorsed 
products,3 the FTC thus far has failed to scrutinize undercover 
marketing, a growing, innovative, and unconventional form of 
marketing communication.4 
Undercover marketing is “a type of advertisement using actors 
in real-life settings to make them appear to be average people.”5 It 
utilizes “people hired by a company to surreptitiously promote a 
product in public establishments.”6 In a typical undercover 
marketing campaign, a marketer hires an actor to go into public 
places and approach consumers with one objective in mind: to 
pitch a product without revealing to consumers that they are the 
subjects of a marketing campaign and that the actor is being paid to 
promote a product.7 A successful undercover marketing operative 
appears to be just another satisfied customer.8 The target consumer 
believes that she is simply engaged in a spontaneous conversation 
with an average Joe or Jane.9 Marketing firms believe that 
                                                          
actions, brought by the Attorney General, and mandatory injunctions. Id. § 45(l). 
In addition, the FTC is granted rulemaking power to supplement the FTC Act in 
order to curb deceptive practices or unfair competition occurring on an industry-
wide basis. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1914). 
3 Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0-255.5 (1980) [hereinafter FTC Guides]. 
4 As of Apr. 19, 2005, all articles and sources cited in and researched in 
preparation for this note failed to report any FTC proceedings against 
undercover marketers. 
5 Undercover Marketing, WEBSTER’S NEW MILLENNIUM DICTIONARY OF 
ENGLISH (2003), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q= 
undercover+marketing. 
6 Id. 
7 Walking, Talking Stealth Ads, THE JOURNAL RECORD, Sept. 12, 2002, at 
2002 WL 4937133; 60 Minutes: Undercover Marketing Uncovered (CBS 
television broadcast, July 25, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2003/10/23/60minutes/main579657.shtml. 
8 The Evening Standard: If This Woman Offers You a Drink, Don’t Think 
It’s Your Night (UK television broadcast, July 31, 2001) (noting that undercover 
marketing operatives are not genuine, disinterested consumers, but rather, the 
“secret agents of capitalism”). 
9 Id. 
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undercover marketing works to capture the coveted 18- to 34-year-
old demographic, which historically has been unmoved by 
traditional print and broadcast advertising.10 Sam Ewen, CEO of 
Interference, Inc., a major New York undercover marketing firm, 
says of undercover marketing, “[W]e can target customers at those 
times when they’re open to being talked to. It’s not as passive as 
television or radio. That gives us an advantage.”11 
FTC regulations, however, mandate that advertisers disclose 
any “material connection” between a person endorsing a product 
and the company selling the product.12 The FTC Guides 
Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising 
(FTC Guides) define a “material connection” as a relationship that 
might affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement.13 This 
note argues that undercover marketing is necessarily deceptive and 
                                                          
10 Vickie Maye, You’re Roach Bait to Marketing Spies, SUN HERALD, Aug. 
19, 2001, at 42 (explaining that undercover marketers believe that going 
undercover is the only way to reach consumers ages 12 to 34 who are “too savvy 
to fall for traditional advertising methods”). 
11 Ryan Naraine, Questions for Sam Ewen, CEO of Interference, Inc., 
atnewyork.com, July 25, 2001, at http://www.atnewyork.com/news/article.php 
/8511_808381. 
12 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5. The regulation states: 
When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of 
the advertised product which might materially affect the weight or 
credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably 
expected by the audience) such connection must be fully disclosed. An 
example of a connection that is ordinarily expected by viewers and 
need not be disclosed is the payment or promise of payment to an 
endorser who is an expert or well known personality, as long as the 
advertiser does not represent that the endorsement was given without 
compensation. However, when the endorser is neither represented in 
the advertisement as an expert nor is known to a significant portion of 
the viewing public, then the advertiser should clearly and 
conspicuously disclose either the payment or promise of compensation 
prior to and in exchange for the endorsement or the fact that the 
endorser knew or had reasons to know or to believe that if the 
endorsement favors the advertised product some benefit, such as an 
appearance on TV, would be extended to the endorser. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
13 Id. 
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therefore violates FTC regulations because the principal goal of 
any undercover marketing campaign is to assure that target 
customers are unaware that they are being pitched to by interested 
product marketers.14 Jonathan Ressler, the pioneer of undercover 
marketing in the United States and the founder of Big Fat 
Promotions, Inc., one of the most prominent undercover marketing 
firms in New York,15 boasts, “You can never, ever tell we’re doing 
it. And we’ll never admit to it. If people ever know they’re being 
marketed to, we’re not doing our job properly.”16 Although the 
FTC prohibits marketers from engaging in this type of conduct 
without revealing to consumers the endorsers’ financial 
connections to the company,17 in practice, the agency has declined 
to bring enforcement actions against undercover marketers 
engaged in deceptive practices, despite the statutory mandate 
directing the FTC to prevent deceptive acts.18 
Part I of this note explores the role of the FTC in regulating, 
enforcing, and defining the parameters of permissible marketing 
techniques. Part II argues that undercover marketing is a deceptive 
practice subject to FTC jurisdiction and that the FTC should 
investigate the practice in order to comply more fully with its 
                                                          
14 Brian Steinberg, Undercover Marketing Is Gaining Ground, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 18, 2000, at B17D (explaining that “the ploy has advertisers plant 
seemingly average Joes in a demographically desirable crowd—without tipping 
consumers off that the people touting the goods are hired to do so”). 
15 JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF 
PROFIT AND POWER 132 (2004) (explaining that Ressler is credited with the 
invention of the undercover marketing technique). 
16 Undercover Agencies, THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 27, 2001, at M03. 
17 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5. See regulation text cited supra 
note 12. 
18 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) states that “[t]he Commission is hereby empowered 
and directed to prevent persons, partnerships or corporations . . . from using . . . 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” (emphasis 
added). Undercover marketing falls within this ambit because undercover 
marketers do not disclose material connections between their companies and 
their endorsers, as required by the FTC Guides. FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 
255.5 (commanding that “when there exists a connection between the endorser 
and the seller of the advertised product which might materially affect the weight 
or credibility of the endorsement [i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected 
by the audience] such connection must be fully disclosed”). 
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mandate to enforce the FTC Act. Part III discusses the striking 
similarities between undercover marketing and infomercials,19 
which have been heavily regulated by the FTC in recent years, and 
argues that undercover marketing should command similar FTC 
regulation. Finally, Part IV evaluates the potential consequences of 
the FTC’s inaction with regard to undercover marketing practices, 
including further tarnished corporate credibility and widespread 
consumer distrust. This note concludes with a call for action by the 
FTC. 
I. THE FTC’S REGULATION OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 
The FTC was initially established to enforce antitrust 
regulations.20 Thus, the FTC’s current position as an advertising 
and marketing enforcer was a “fortuitous by-product” of the terms 
of the FTC Act.21 In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Federal 
Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., construed the Act 
to give the FTC the power to regulate deceptive advertising and 
marketing affecting consumers.22 The Court remanded to the Fifth 
Circuit a judgment setting aside the FTC’s cease-and-desist order 
against Sperry & Hutchinson Co., a trading stamp company, for 
violating federal antitrust law by suppressing customer trading 
stamp exchanges.23 Finding that the FTC had inadequately linked 
                                                          
19 According to the FTC, infomercials are advertisements “presented in the 
guise of a talk-show format.” FTC v. California Pacific Research, Inc., No. CV-
N-88-602BRT, 1991 WL 208470, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 1991). Similarly, 
undercover marketing schemes are face-to-face marketing interactions with 
customers presented in the guise of everyday conversations with average-
looking strangers. See, e.g., The Evening Standard, supra note 8. 
20 15 U.S.C. § 41 (effective Sept. 26, 1914). 
21 W.H. Ramsay Lewis, Infomercials, Deceptive Advertising and the 
Federal Trade Commission, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 853, 854 (1992) (citing 
EARL W. KITNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 56 (1978)). 
While the FTC Act was originally intended to prevent instances of unfair 
competition between companies, the FTC’s current regulatory scheme now 
focuses on protecting consumers from marketing companies, in addition to 
protecting companies from one another. Id. 
22 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). 
23 Id. at 250. 
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Sperry & Hutchinson Co.’s conduct to a violation of antitrust law, 
the Court considered whether the FTC was limited to regulating 
only those deceptive acts or practices that violate the spirit of the 
antitrust laws, that is, only those practices that are unfair to 
consumers and also affect competition, as the Fifth Circuit held.24 
The Court held that the FTC has broad regulatory power to protect 
both companies and consumers, noting that Congress, when 
creating the statutory FTC powers, explicitly considered and 
rejected the inclusion of a rigid list of unfair practices to be 
regulated.25 
The Federal Trade Commission’s authority to regulate 
deceptive advertising and marketing is contained within Section 5 
of the FTC Act (Section 5).26 Section 5 provides that unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in and affecting commerce are 
unlawful.27 In Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture 
Advertising Service Company, the Supreme Court noted the 
generality of Section 5, explaining that the statute’s proscriptions 
are flexible to permit their later definition “with particularity by the 
myriad of cases from the field of business.”28 Further, in a 
conference report, Congress explained that Section 5 is necessarily 
                                                          
24 Id. at 239, 248. 
25 Id. at 239-240. Congress acknowledged that the potential for human 
inventiveness in the field of consumer manufacturing made it unwise to strip the 
FTC of regulatory discretion and latitude. Id. 
26 As amended in 1938. Kathyleen A. O’Brien, Strategies for Successfully 
Defending Against Federal Trade Commission Investigations of False and 
Deceptive Advertising, 775 PLI/COMM 269 (1997) (explaining that while Section 
12 of the Act relates specifically to false advertising concerning food, drugs, 
devices, and cosmetics, Section 5 of the Act grants the FTC broad jurisdiction 
over other types of deceptive acts and practices in and affecting commerce that 
relate to the public interest). 
27 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1938) (stating “[u]nfair methods of competition, in 
and affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful”). 
28 FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 
(1953). The Court, after explaining that Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC 
broad power to regulate and define unfair or deceptive acts and practices, held 
that the FTC exercised proper discretion in finding that a film distributor’s 
exclusive screening agreements with theater operators unfairly restrained 
competition. Id. at 394-95. 
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broad because there is “no limit to human inventiveness in this 
field” and an attempt to pinpoint particular prohibited practices 
would prove futile.29 
The FTC has interpreted its expansive mandate to permit the 
agency’s investigation into 
(1) any acts, practices, conduct, or circumstances which the 
Commission has been authorized by law to investigate; (2) 
suspected violations of the laws and regulations enforced 
by the Commission; (3) industry practices to determine 
whether a trade regulation, rule, legislation, or other means 
of corrective action would be appropriate; or (4) possible 
violations of a Commission order to cease and desist.30 
FTC investigations may take two forms: nonpublic or public.31 
In a nonpublic investigation, the FTC keeps confidential the details 
of its investigation of individuals or business entities to protect 
against premature adverse publicity.32 Conversely, the FTC may 
conduct public investigations of the practices of an entire industry 
or group of industries when it feels that the interests of the public 
will be best served by an open investigation.33 In either case, with 
                                                          
29 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914). See also FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (explaining that the generality of 
Section 5 “necessarily gives the Commission an influential role in interpreting § 
5 and in applying it to the facts of particular cases arising out of unprecedented 
situations”). 
30 FTC Operating Manual, ch. 3.1.2.1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
foia/adminstaffmanuals.htm. 
31 Id. at ch. 3.3.3.1, 3.3.3.2. 
32 Id. at ch. 3.3.3.1. 
33 Id. at ch. 3.3.3.2. The FTC publicly announces open investigations 
through news releases outlining the FTC’s charges against an individual or 
company and the allegedly offending act or practice. The news release may 
also provide a synopsis of prior FTC action against the individual or 
company. Each release directs readers to the FTC’s webpage or a mailing 
address to obtain a copy of the formal complaint. See, e.g., News Release, 
Federal Trade Commission, Ads for Various Diet Supplements and Topical 
Gels Don’t Cut the Fat, Says the FTC (June 16, 2004) (announcing the 
FTC’s administrative complaint against Basic Research, L.L.C. and others 
for making false and unsubstantiated claims about weight-loss and fat-loss 
gels and supplements), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/ 
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the objective of compelling enforcement or corrective action, the 
agency makes detailed inquiries into possible violations of the laws 
and regulations it enforces.34 
Enforcement mechanisms and other corrective measures 
employed by the FTC include injunctions, investigational consent 
agreements, and recommendations for formal FTC complaints, 
trade regulation rules, industry guides, and policy statements.35 
The wide spectrum of enforcement mechanisms available to the 
FTC allows the agency to choose from among various remedies, 
including the implementation of prophylactic measures, such as the 
issuance of a new industry guide or enforcement policy 
statement.36 These measures may guard against the potential evils 
                                                          
dietsupp.htm; News Release, Federal Trade Commission, Marketer of 
Electronic Abdominal Exercise Belt Charged With Making False Claims 
(Oct. 1, 2003) (announcing the FTC’s administrative complaint against 
Telebrands Corp. for using deceptive practices, specifically 
unsubstantiated product claims, in the marketing and selling of the “Ab 
Force” exercise device), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/ 
abforce.htm. 
34 FTC Operating Manual, supra note 30, at ch. 3.3.4.1. 
35 Id. at ch. 3.1.3.4. 
36 Issuance of a new industry guide may be appropriate “[w]here there is an 
indication that a large number of persons are engaged in a similar type of 
violation” or when widespread violations are threatened by the existence of 
“competitive considerations” that may “cause many individual persons and 
firms to adopt and be reluctant to abandon a particular practice until other 
members of the industry have begun to do so.” Id. at ch. 8.3.3(1)-(2). The 
Operating Manual instructs that, “[w]hen promulgation of a guide may provide 
the impetus for members of an industry to voluntarily correct their business 
practices and thereby eliminate violations, it can be an effective means of 
achieving compliance.” Id. at ch. 8.3.3(2). Industry guides may be more 
instructive than official FTC regulations because the Operating Manual 
encourages industry guide drafters to include “meaningful factual criteria” for 
determining when a violation exists rather than making blanket legal 
conclusions, such as stating that a practice is illegal when it has the capacity to 
deceive. Id. at ch. 8.3.3(3). For example, in 2001, the FTC promulgated the 
Guides for the Jewelry, Precious Metals, and Pewter Industries, which 
addressed such industry-wide issues as the proper usage of certain terms and 
representations regarding gemstones, metals, and product quality. Federal Trade 
Commission, For Business, Jewelry Guides, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bcp/guides/jewel-gd.htm. 
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inherent in certain industries before the FTC specifically targets 
individuals or business entities by issuing complaints and holding 
formal hearings.37 The FTC thus enjoys great discretion in crafting 
remedies to combat deceptive practices.38 To assist agency 
officials in determining whether particular practices are deceptive, 
the FTC has developed a Policy Statement on Deception.39 
A. The FTC’s Policy Statement on Deception: Factors for 
Identifying Deceptive Practices 
In recognition of the potential for confusion regarding the 
reach of the FTC’s broad mandate, the agency sought to provide a 
single definitive statement on what constitutes a deceptive act or 
practice by issuing a Policy Statement on Deception (Policy 
Statement) in 1983.40 Although FTC policy statements are not 
binding law,41 they set forth the circumstances in which the 
                                                          
 Issuance of an enforcement policy statement may be based on the 
“accumulated expertise of the Commission acquired from numerous 
investigations and proceedings concerning a particular industry or practice,” or 
may be “the outgrowth of an independent Commission determination that 
pronouncement of an interpretive statement or enforcement policy upon a 
particular subject will further the public interest.” FTC Operating Manual, supra 
note 30, at ch. 8.5.4. For example, in 1994, the FTC issued the Enforcement 
Policy Statement on Food Advertising, explaining its joint enforcement 
jurisdiction over food advertising with the Food and Drug Administration and 
the FTC’s method of evaluating certain nutritional claims. Federal Trade 
Commission, For Business, Advertising Guidance, Food Advertising, available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-food.htm. 
37 See supra text accompanying note 2 (describing FTC enforcement 
procedures). 
38 FTC Operating Manual, supra note 30, at ch. 3.1.2.2 (explaining that 
“[t]he Commission possesses broad jurisdiction to deal with unfair or deceptive 
acts and practices and unfair methods of competition under the FTC [Act] and 
the various special statutes enforced by the Commission”). 
39 FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC 
Policy Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept. 
htm. 
40 Id. 
41 FTC Operating Manual, supra note 30, at ch. 8.6.1 (stating that while 
policy statements are intended to clarify the rules that they describe, they do not 
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Commission intends to take corrective action, or provide 
interpretive statements on laws or substantive rules.42 The FTC’s 
1983 Policy Statement outlined three criteria that the FTC should 
consider in determining whether a particular act or practice is 
deceptive; each of the three factors must be present for the FTC to 
intervene.43 These factors include the likelihood that the practice 
will mislead the consumer, the reasonableness of the consumer’s 
reaction to the practice, and the materiality of the practice from the 
consumer’s perspective. 
The FTC officially adopted the Policy Statement in In the 
Matter of Cliffdale Associates.44 In that case, the administrative 
law judge concluded that an unfair or deceptive practice was “any 
advertising representation that ha[d] the tendency and capacity to 
mislead or deceive a prospective purchaser.”45 The FTC, however, 
rejected that approach as “circular and therefore inadequate to 
provide guidance on how a deception claim should be analyzed.”46 
Rather, the FTC explained that it must evaluate deceptive practices 
                                                          
have binding force). 
42 Id. at ch. 8.5.2. The principle function of an enforcement policy 
statement is to deter violations of the law by clarifying any ambiguities or 
uncertainties that may arise concerning FTC enforcement policies. Id. at 
ch. 8.5.3. 
43 Id. 
44 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) (appending the Policy Statement to the decision). 
The FTC held that Cliffdale engaged in deceptive acts and practices by making 
unsubstantiated claims about its Ball-Matic Valve (an automobile retrofit 
device). Id. Further, the FTC held that the claims were deceptive because 
Cliffdale had failed to reveal its relationship with Ball-Matic endorsers, many of 
whom were Cliffdale business associates being passed off as disinterested 
customers. Id. In support of its decision, the FTC cited the FTC Guides, supra 
note 3, at §§ 255.0-55.5, which require companies to disclose material 
connections between the company and its product’s endorsers. Id. See infra Part 
I.B for further discussion of the FTC Guides. 
45 Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110. 
46 Id. The FTC recognized that a clearer, more articulable standard was 
necessary for evaluating deceptive practices. Simply asking whether the 
particular alleged deceptive practice had a tendency to deceive an undefined 
class of consumers provided no framework for future evaluations under the FTC 
Act. Id. 
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based on the factors laid out in its Policy Statement.47 
1. The “Likely to Mislead” Factor 
The Policy Statement provides that a practice will be deemed 
deceptive only in the case of a “representation, omission or 
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer.”48 Because Section 
5 is more prophylactic than punitive in nature, a mere capacity to 
deceive may garner FTC attention.49 Thus, a finding of deception 
does not require actual deception so long as the practice is likely to 
mislead.50 If an individual or entity induces contact with a 
consumer through “a representation, practice, or omission that is 
likely to mislead the consumer,”51 a violation of the Act will result, 
even if the consumer is later informed about the marketer’s use of 
deceptive tactics.52 Further, if a message’s overall impression is 
misleading, it is no defense that some elements of the 
communication are true because “words and sentences may be 
literally and technically true and yet be framed in such a setting as 
to mislead or deceive.”53 For example, in In the Matter of 
                                                          
47 Id. 
48 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. 
49 FTC v. Sterling Drug, 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963). After noting the 
broad scope of FTC power to regulate deceptive practices, the court held that the 
FTC was not erroneously denied a temporary injunction against Sterling Drug. 
Id. The FTC alleged that Sterling Drug deceived consumers by improperly 
linking its drugs to an American Medical Association endorsement, but the court 
found that the FTC failed to present sufficient evidence for such a finding at the 
preliminary injunction stage. Id. 
50 Id.; Resort Rental Car Sys. Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (1975) 
(explaining that “advertising capable of being interpreted in a misleading way 
should be construed against the advertiser” and that “actual deception need not 
be shown”). 
51 Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110. 
52 Resort, 518 F.2d at 964 (explaining that “[t]he Federal Trade Act is 
violated if [the act or practice in question] induces the first contact through 
deception, even if the buyer later becomes fully informed”). 
53 Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943). In 
Bockenstette, the court upheld an FTC cease-and-desist order based on findings 
that defendant hatchery owners deceptively advertised that they were linked to 
the National Poultry Improvement Plan, which represented a choice group of 
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Encyclopedia Britannica, the FTC found a deceptive omission in 
violation of the FTC Act when sales representatives 
misrepresented the purpose of their initial contact with 
customers.54 Encyclopedia Britannica salespersons went door-to-
door claiming to be conducting brand recognition surveys when, in 
fact, the main purpose of their contact with the homeowners was to 
sell encyclopedias.55 The FTC held such a failure to disclose 
impermissible and deceptive because, although surveys were in 
fact conducted, they were merely the gateway to encyclopedia 
sales.56 
2. The Reasonableness of Interpretation Factor 
The Policy Statement provides that the second factor for 
determining the existence of a deceptive act or practice is the 
reasonableness of the consumer’s reaction to or interpretation of 
the act or practice.57 The statement provides that “to be deceptive 
the representation, omission or practice must be likely to mislead 
reasonable consumers under the circumstances.”58 Reasonable, 
however, does not necessarily mean intelligent or discerning.59 
When reviewing FTC orders, courts recognize that in order to 
receive protection, consumers should not be expected to be 
especially bright or discerning.60 Indeed, as noted by the Supreme 
                                                          
female hens, when in fact they were not. Id. While the hatchery’s hens were 
previously approved by the National Poultry Improvement Plan, once they came 
under the defendants’ ownership they lost that title and could no longer be 
advertised as such. Id. 
54 87 F.T.C. 421 (1976). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. 
58 Id. 
59 Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618 (3d Cir. 1976). In 
Beneficial, the Court upheld an FTC order, holding that Beneficial’s 
advertisements for loans to those entitled to income tax refunds were deceptive 
because they failed to indicate that potential borrowers had to meet certain credit 
standards set by Beneficial. Id. 
60 Id. (quoting Callman, Unfair Competition and Trademarks § 19.2(a)(1), 
which, inter alia, described the general consumer public as a vast multitude that 
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Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education 
Society, 
[l]aws are made to protect the trusting as well as the 
suspicious. The best element of business has long since 
decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, 
and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied on to 
reward fraud and deception.61 
As to the act or practice in question, the Policy Statement cites 
to Beneficial Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, in which the 
FTC found that “[i]n determining the meaning of . . . a sales 
presentation, the important criterion is the net impression that it is 
likely to make on the general populace.”62 Expanding on this 
notion, in American Home Products v. Federal Trade Commission, 
the Third Circuit held that when considering the reasonableness of 
the consumer’s reaction, the FTC has the right to examine the total 
impression made by an advertising tactic.63 Otherwise, “the 
Commission would have limited recourse against crafty advertisers 
whose deceptive messages were conveyed by means other than, or 
in addition to, spoken words.”64 Therefore, when considering a 
consumer’s reaction to an act or practice, the FTC must 
acknowledge that “[t]he ultimate impression upon the mind of the 
[consumer] arises from the sum total of not only what is said but 
                                                          
includes “the ignorant, and unthinking and the credulous, who, in making 
purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and 
general impressions”); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942) 
(quoting Callman as cited in Florence Mfg. Co. v. Dowd, 178 F. 73 2d Cir. 
1910). The Aronberg court affirmed an FTC cease-and-desist order against the 
defendant, charging that Aronberg engaged in deceptive practices by advertising 
his over-the-counter medicinal remedy without revealing its potential dangers to 
consumers’ health. Id. 
61 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937). 
62 Beneficial, 542 F.2d at 618 (citing Grolier, 91 F.T.C. 315, 430 (1978), 
remanded on other grounds, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980), modified on other 
grounds, 98 F.T.C. 882 (1981), reissued, 99 F.T.C. 379 (1982)). 
63 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). In American Home Products, the court held 
that substantial evidence supported an FTC finding that the defendant 
deceptively represented that its nonprescription analgesics were proven superior 
to competitors. 
64 Id. at 688. 
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also of all that is reasonably implied.”65 
3. Materiality Factor 
The Policy Statement also requires that the representation, 
omission, or practice be “material” in order to give rise to a finding 
of deception.66 The Policy Statement defines a material 
representation as an act or practice likely to affect the consumer’s 
conduct or decision with regard to the challenged product or 
service.67 So long as materiality is found, it is irrelevant whether a 
consumer was actually deceived by the practice.68 In Federal 
Trade Commission v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., the Supreme Court 
made clear that material representations or omissions are not 
limited to those related to the substantive aspects of the product or 
service being promoted.69 Indeed, the Court held that any 
representations or omissions that materially induce consumer 
action are subject to the proscriptions of the Act.70 
                                                          
65 Aronberg, 132 F.2d at 167 (noting that the public is often influenced by 
appearances and general impressions and not simply the specific language used 
in advertisements). 
66 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. The Policy Statement cites the 
definition of materiality in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND § 538(2) 
(1977), which states that a material misrepresentation or omission is one that 
“the reasonable person would regard as important in deciding how to act, or one 
which the maker knows the recipient, because of his or her own peculiarities, is 
likely to consider important.” The RESTATEMENT § 538(2)(a) cmt. d (1977) 
states that the material fact does not necessarily have to affect the money paid in 
a transaction and explains that “there are many more-or-less sentimental 
considerations that the ordinary man regards as important.” Id. 
67  FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. 
68 Id. 
69 Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 386-87 (rejecting respondent’s 
argument that “the only material facts are those which deal with the substantive 
qualities of a product,” in favor of the FTC’s position that “the 
misrepresentation of any fact so long as it materially induces a purchaser’s 
decision to buy is a deception prohibited by § 5”). In Colgate-Palmolive, the 
Court reinstated an FTC order that held that the undisclosed use of a prop made 
of plexiglass and sand in a commercial to simulate a razor shaving a piece of 
sandpaper clean was a material deceptive practice. Id. 
70 Id. Accordingly, deception may stem from marketing or advertising 
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B. FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and 
Testimonials in Advertising 
In addition to its Policy Statement on Deception, the FTC has 
provided guidance regarding the use of advertising endorsements 
in Section 255 of Title 16 of the Code of Federal Regulations.71 
Promulgated by the FTC, this section, known as the FTC Guides 
Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising,72 defines endorsement as 
[a]ny advertising message (including verbal statements, 
demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, 
likeness or other identifying personal characteristics of an 
individual or the name or seal of an organization) which 
message consumers are likely to believe reflects the 
opinions, beliefs, findings, or experience of a party other 
than the sponsoring advertiser. The party whose opinions, 
beliefs, findings, or experience the message appears to 
reflect will be called the endorser and may be an individual, 
group or institution.73 
Section 255.5 provides that when there is a material connection 
between an endorser and the seller of an advertised product that 
might “materially affect the weight or credibility of the 
endorsement,74 such connection must be fully disclosed.”75 
Specifically, the FTC mandates that if actors are employed to pose 
as actual customers, this fact must be disclosed to the public.76 The 
                                                          
methods, not just from unsubstantiated product claims. 
71 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at §§ 255.0-255.5. 
72 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1914) (giving the FTC authority to prescribe rules with 
respect to deceptive acts or practices in and affecting commerce). 
73 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.0(b) (emphasis added). 
74 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5. In other words, the connection is 
not reasonably expected by the audience. 
75 Id. (emphasis added). 
76 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.2(b). The regulations state, 
“[a]dvertisements presenting endorsements by what are represented, directly or 
by implication, to be ‘actual customers’ should utilize actual customers, both in 
the audio and video or clearly and conspicuously disclose that the persons in 
such advertisements are not actual customers of the advertised product.” Id. 
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FTC clarified the appropriate application of the regulation with the 
following hypothetical example: 
An advertisement purports to portray a “hidden camera” 
situation in a crowded cafeteria at breakfast time. A 
spokesperson for the advertiser asks a series of actual 
patrons of the cafeteria for their spontaneous, honest 
opinions of the advertiser’s recently introduced breakfast 
cereal. Even though the words “hidden camera” are not 
displayed on the screen, and even though none of the actual 
patrons is specifically identified during the advertisement, 
the net impression conveyed to consumers may well be that 
these are actual consumers, and not actors. If the actors 
have been employed, that fact should be disclosed.77 
II. UNDERCOVER MARKETING IS A DECEPTIVE PRACTICE BASED ON 
FTC STANDARDS 
A marketing industry publication aimed at chief marketing 
officers defines undercover marketing as “the use of actors or shills 
to pitch a product in a public place without it being revealed that 
they are salespeople.”78 Advertising and marketing industry leaders 
and numerous consumer advocacy groups are increasingly 
questioning and criticizing the use of this practice.79 The executive 
director for the Center for Digital Democracy calls the undercover 
                                                          
77 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.2, Example 3 (emphasis added). Part 
III of this note further discusses the FTC’s application of the FTC Guides 
to infomercials and argues that undercover marketing is as deceptive as certain 
infomercial practices, which are heavily regulated by the FTC. 
78 Lingo Lab: A Marketing Glossary: Undercover Marketing, CMO 
Magazine, available at http://www.cmomagazine.com/glossary/term.html? 
CID=55. 
79 Suzanne Vranica, That Guy Showing Off His Hot New Phone May Be a 
Shill, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at B1 (noting that the executive director of 
Commercial Alert, a nonprofit consumer activist organization, criticizes 
undercover marketing as deceptive); Walking, Talking Stealth Ads, supra note 7 
(explaining that many people in the advertising industry agree with consumer 
protection advocates that undercover marketers go too far and quoting a 
managing director of Atlanta’s Titan Advertising who argues that undercover 
marketers are lying to and deceiving the public). 
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marketing phenomenon the “brand-washing of America.”80 
Nevertheless, the FTC thus far has taken no initiative to challenge 
the practice, despite its signature element of deceptiveness.81 
Although the FTC has no specific regulations addressing the 
practice of undercover marketing, its authority to regulate 
undercover marketing falls within the sweeping coverage of 
Section 5 of the FTC Act.82 
As a threshold matter, the FTC has jurisdiction to regulate 
undercover marketing as a form of advertising in and affecting 
commerce.83 Advertising has been defined to include “[a]ny action 
intended to draw the attention of the public or of a segment thereof 
to merchandise, a service, a person or organization, or to a line of 
conduct.”84 Undercover marketing easily falls within this 
categorization. Operatives take action to draw unsuspecting 
consumers’ attention to a certain product.85 Typical undercover 
marketing techniques include placing attractive young men and 
                                                          
80 Daniel Eisenberg & Laura Bradford, It’s an Ad, Ad, Ad, Ad World: As 
Conventional Methods Lose Their Punch, More Marketers are Going 
Undercover to Reach Customers, TIME (Canadian Edition), Sept. 23, 2002 
(explaining that critics believe that undercover marketing “tinker[s]” with 
consumers’ minds). The Center for Digital Democracy seeks to enhance public 
understanding of the U.S. digital media system and make the media industry 
more accountable to the public interest. See CDD Mission Statement, at 
http://www.democraticmedia.org/cddmissionstatement.html. 
81 As of Apr. 19, 2005, all articles and sources cited in and researched in 
preparation for this note fail to report any FTC proceedings against undercover 
marketers. 
82 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(2) (1938) (stating “[t]he Commission is hereby 
empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . 
from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”). 
83 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39 (explaining that marketing 
practices, such as bait-and-switch schemes or providing incomplete information 
to the consumer, are covered by the Act in addition to traditional advertising); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(2) (empowering and directing the FTC to “prevent 
persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using . . . unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce”). 
84 O’Brien, supra note 26, at 276 (quoting George E. Rosden & Peter E. 
Rosden, The Law of Advertising, 17.02[2] at 17-36 (1995). 
85 60 Minutes, supra note 7. 
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women in bars to conspicuously talk about how great their vodka 
tastes and recommend that other patrons order the same,86 paying 
mothers to extol the benefits of their new laundry detergent at their 
children’s Little League games,87 and compensating celebrities to 
appear on talk shows and praise prescription drugs without 
indicating that they are spokespersons for the manufacturer.88 
Although FTC spokespersons have indicated that undercover 
marketing raises concerns, in their view, undercover marketing 
may simply be unethical, not illegal.89 An assistant director of the 
FTC’s Advertising Practices Division has said of undercover 
marketing, “It’s troubling, but whether it rises to the level of being 
illegal is not clear. At a minimum it’s not clear that there’s enough 
harm done to make it a priority for the FTC.”90 However, an 
analysis of a typical undercover marketing encounter reveals that 
the success of undercover marketing depends on meeting all three 
of the FTC’s criteria for a deceptive practice,91 none of which 
references injury or “harm done” to the consumer.92 Therefore, the 
FTC is empowered to regulate undercover marketing and should 
make regulation of this deceptive practice a priority. 
An example of a typical undercover marketing scheme assists 
in illustrating the deceptive nature of this practice. In 2002, Sony 
Ericsson hired the marketing firm Interference, Inc. and launched 
                                                          
86 Jim Rutenberg, Phenomenon (Buy Me), N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at 21. 
87 Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Advertisers Go Undercover to Push 
Products, FOX NEWS, Aug. 17, 2001, available at http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0%2C2933%2C32179%2C00.html. 
88 Eisenberg, supra note 80. 
89 Jana Ritter, Buyer Beware: Uncovering Undercover Advertising, THE 
GALT GLOBAL REVIEW, Mar. 18, 2003, at http://www.galtglobalreview.com/ 
business/ buyer_beware.html (explaining that the Federal Trade Commission 
has yet to charge Big Fat Promotions, Inc. with anything other than bad taste); 
Donaldson-Evans, supra note 87 (quoting Mary Engle, assistant director of the 
FTC’s advertising practices division). 
90 Donaldson-Evans, supra note 87. 
91 See Part II.A-C (noting the three factors necessary in order to find the 
existence of a deceptive practice, including “likely to mislead,” “reasonableness 
of interpretation” and “materiality”). 
92 See Part I.A. 3 (noting that actual consumer deception is not necessary 
for a practice to be deemed deceptive so long as there is a capacity to deceive). 
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its “fake tourist” campaign.93 Sony sent actors to crowded tourist 
destinations, such as New York’s Times Square and Seattle’s 
Space Needle, to pose as tourists.94 The operatives went out in 
pairs, posing as boyfriend and girlfriend, and asked passersby if 
they would mind taking pictures of the couple.95 The operatives 
handed willing parties a new Sony camera cell phone, acting as if 
it were their own, and initiated conversations about the phone and 
its various features.96 At no point during the interaction did the 
operatives reveal that they were employed by Sony to market the 
new camera phone.97 
Sony’s campaign is representative of many undercover 
marketing schemes and, as such, it may serve to highlight the 
applicability of the FTC’s criteria for identifying deceptive 
practices to undercover marketing.98 Indeed, Sony’s campaign 
satisfies each of the FTC’s criteria for deception, thus indicating 
that undercover marketing is ripe for FTC regulation and 
enforcement action. First, Sony misleads consumers by omitting 
the fact that the “tourists” are actually paid endorsers.99 Second, 
the beliefs of consumers that they are not part of a paid marketing 
campaign when they are spontaneously stopped on the street are 
                                                          
93 Vranica, supra note 79; 60 Minutes, supra note 7. See also Case Study: 
Sony Ericsson, at http://www.interferenceinc.com/sony.html. The case study 
outlines the marketing elements utilized in the Sony campaign, including fake 
tourists and “leaners,” the term used for attractive actors placed in bars and clubs 
to promote the camera. 
94 Vranica, supra note 79; 60 Minutes, supra note 7 (noting that in Times 
Square, the “ancient home of American marketing, people on the street once 
“picked pockets, but now, they mess with your mind”). 
95 Vranica, supra note 79 (noting that the operatives have no intention of 
identifying that they work for Sony); 60 Minutes, supra note 7. 
96 Vranica, supra note 79 (explaining that the idea is to have consumers 
believe that they’ve “stumbled onto a hot new product”); 60 Minutes, supra note 
7. 
97 Vranica, supra note 79; 60 Minutes, supra note 7 (explaining that the 
Sony operatives were “irresistibly innocent looking” and that the “Good 
Samaritan” picture-taking consumers had no idea that they were “being had”). 
98 See supra Part I.A (outlining the three FTC criteria for finding a practice 
deceptive). 
99 See infra Part II.A. 
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entirely reasonable.100 Finally, Sony’s failure to disclose the true 
nature of the interaction is a material omission.101 
A. Failure to Disclose That Undercover Operatives Are Paid 
Marketers Is An Omission Likely to Mislead the 
Consumer 
In order to qualify as a deceptive practice, the Policy Statement 
first requires that there be an omission likely to mislead the 
customer.102 Undercover marketing easily satisfies this criterion 
because the omission in undercover marketing is the essence of the 
sales pitch. Instead of deceiving the consumer about a particular 
attribute of the product or service, a successful undercover 
marketing operative deceives the consumer into believing that he is 
not being marketed to at all.103 In fact, the thought should never 
enter the consumer’s mind and, if it does, the undercover 
marketing interaction is viewed as a failure.104 If an undercover 
marketing operative fails to disclose that she is paid by a company 
to promote its product and gives no information to that effect, the 
customer is almost certain to be deceived by this omission.105 
With undercover marketing, omission is the mission.106 In fact, 
                                                          
100 See infra Part II.B. 
101 See infra Part II.C. 
102 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. See Part I.A.1. 
103 See Part I.A.1 (discussing deceptive representations and omissions). 
104 Undercover Agencies, supra note 16 (noting undercover marketer 
Jonathan Ressler’s insistence that his operatives’ true identities remain secret in 
order to preserve the success of the campaign). 
105 A useful comparison may be made to infomercials, a marketing practice 
heavily targeted by the FTC in recent years. See Lewis, supra note 21; O’Brien, 
supra note 26. Infomercials are troubling to the FTC because it is rarely clear 
whether the audience members or endorsers in the infomercials are paid for their 
participation, thereby creating a tendency to deceive viewers. See Lewis, supra 
note 21. Undercover marketing is much the same. The deception lies not in the 
claims about the product, but in the representation that the endorser has no 
financial connection to the product he is extolling. See infra Part III for a further 
discussion of this comparison. 
106 John Heinzl, Beware Tourists With Talking Cameras, THE GLOBE AND 
MAIL, Aug. 1, 2002, at A1 (commenting on the Sony “fake tourist” operatives, 
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“[t]he whole key to undercover marketing is never knowing that 
it’s going on.”107 Once a consumer finds out that the person he was 
chatting with is actually a shill, the cover is blown and the 
transaction loses its effectiveness.108 In the Sony cell phone 
campaign, for example, the passerby is not told that the “tourist” is 
actually a Sony employee.109 The seemingly innocent acts of being 
asked to take a photograph and engaging in friendly banter about 
the camera are not likely to tip off consumers that they are really 
the targets of a marketing pitch. A skillful operative cleverly 
disguises her mission.110 Consequently, there is an omission that is 
likely to deceive.111 Further, in addition to the Policy Statement, 
the endorsement-specific regulations contained in the FTC Guides 
Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising112 provide that when marketers do not reveal that their 
endorsers are paid, customers will be deemed to have been 
unlawfully deceived.113 The scenario engineered by Sony’s 
                                                          
Jon Maron, director of marketing for Sony Ericsson, explained, “they’re not 
identified as Sony Ericsson employees because it takes the spontaneity of the 
conversation away”). 
107 BAKAN, supra note 15, at 132-34 (quoting Jonathan Ressler of Big Fat 
Promotions, Inc.). 
108 Id. 
109 Heinzl, supra note 106. 
110 Undercover Agencies, supra note 16. 
111 Encyclopedia Britannica, 87 F.T.C. 421. 
112 FTC Guides, supra note 3, §§ 255.0-55.5. See Part I.B (discussing the 
FTC Guides). 
113 See, e.g., In the Matter of Creative Health, Inc., 2004 FTC LEXIS 51 
(2004) (holding that Creative Health Inc. engaged in a deceptive practice in 
violation of the FTC Act and the FTC Guides by failing to reveal that some 
endorsers were principals in a public relations company that earned 
commissions on sales related to its promotions and that other endorsers were 
product distributors who earned profits based on their sales of the product); In 
the Matter of TrendMark, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 375 (1998) (holding that TrendMark, 
Inc.’s failure to reveal that its endorsers were distributors of its diet products 
who earned profits on their sales was a deceptive practice in violation of the 
FTC Act and the FTC Guides); In the Matter of Bodywise International, Inc., 
120 F.T.C. 704 (1995) (holding that Bodywise International, Inc.’s failure to 
reveal that its endorsers were healthcare professionals and physicians who 
derived income from Bodywise product sales was a deceptive practice in 
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operatives ensures this result. 
B. Consumers in Undercover Marketing Campaigns Will Not 
Reasonably Suspect That They Are the Subjects of a 
Sales Pitch 
The second criterion in evaluating a potentially deceptive 
practice requires an examination of the act or practice from the 
perspective of a consumer acting reasonably in the 
circumstances.114 The relevant question is whether the consumer’s 
reaction to or interpretation of a practice is reasonable; in this case, 
whether a consumer’s impression that he was not part of a paid 
marketing interaction is reasonable.115 
Undercover marketers strive to penetrate consumers’ lives and 
buying processes in a seamless and undetectable manner.116 The 
goal of undercover marketers is to make sure that the deception is 
as authentic as possible.117 The target audience is the 18- to 34-
year-old market, a market that increasingly rejects the traditional, 
obvious sales pitch.118 Operatives will congregate in places where 
consumers usually gather, such as bars and parks.119 They have 
                                                          
violation of the FTC Act and the FTC Guides). 
114 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. See also Part I.A. 2. 
115 The FTC Policy Statement explains that the appropriate inquiry is 
whether the consumer’s interpretation of a practice is reasonable. See supra note 
39. Therefore, in an undercover marketing situation, the appropriate inquiry 
would be whether the consumer’s belief that he was conversing with an average 
Joe or Jane is reasonable. 
116 Undercover Agencies, supra note 16 (quoting John Palumbo, Big Fat 
Promotions, Inc.’s chief strategy officer). Palumbo explained, “[P]eople have to 
see [the product], they have to understand it in a real way. The only way for 
them to understand it in a real way is for it to be in their world. And that’s what 
we do. We put it in their life.” Id. 
117 Rutenberg, supra note 86. 
118 Maye, supra note 10 (explaining that Jonathan Ressler believes that 
undercover marketing is the only way to reach young people who are “too savvy 
to fall for traditional advertising methods”); The Evening Standard, supra note 8 
(noting that 12- to 34-year-old consumers are especially hard to reach because 
they have “grown up with the heavy-sell and are now inured to it”). 
119 Rutenberg, supra note 86. 
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similar physical characteristics as the consumers, enabling them to 
fit in with the target audience, or are especially attractive in order 
to attract the attention of the target audience.120 When the 
marketing communication is over, the consumers should have no 
inclination that they were the subjects of a marketing pitch.121 
Undercover marketing actors who do their jobs well create the 
reasonable impression that they are not being paid to push a 
product.122 Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable for consumers to 
believe that they are not part of a paid marketing interaction. The 
“sum total” of what is said and what is reasonably implied would 
lead a reasonable consumer to believe that he was innocently 
conversing with a friendly passerby, not that he was the subject of 
an undercover marketing scheme.123 
By way of example, Essential Reality, a gaming company, 
launched an undercover campaign to promote its new “P-5 Glove,” 
a gaming accessory that enables users to fly planes and fire 
weapons on their computers.124 Innocent-looking actors were hired 
to place themselves in Starbucks coffee shops, use the glove, and 
                                                          
120 Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Roobina Ohanian, Recent Trends in the Law of 
Endorsement Advertising: Infomercials, Celebrity Endorsers and Nontraditional 
Defendants in Deceptive Advertising Cases, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603 (1991) 
(explaining that endorsement marketing is most effective when the consumer 
can identify with the endorser); The Evening Standard, supra note 8 (explaining 
that undercover marketing companies choose their operatives with care to find 
just the right look for the target consumer). 
121 Rutenberg, supra note 86. 
122 Id. 
123 Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942) (explaining that 
“[t]he ultimate impression upon the mind of the [consumer] arises from the 
sum total of not only what is said but also of all that is reasonably 
implied”); see, e.g., 60 Minutes, supra note 7 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell, 
author of THE TIPPING POINT). Gladwell explained of undercover marketing: 
[T]here’s a set of rules that govern a lot of advertising and we’re aware 
of the rules. We’re aware that the woman in the advertising for Ivory 
Soap is prettier than most women in our lives. A line is crossed, I think, 
when you go outside of those normal boundaries and start to deceive 
people in ways that they are . . . totally unwitting to what’s going on. 
Id. 
124 60 Minutes, supra note 7. 
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initiate conversation about the device.125 John Flaherty, an 
unsuspecting coffee drinker, conversed with one of the actors 
about the glove.126 When later told by 60 Minutes broadcast 
producers that he was a subject in an undercover campaign, he 
admitted that there was something disturbing about the scheme 
once he learned the true purpose of the interaction.127 The Sony 
“fake tourist” example is similar.128 
The FTC might seek to regulate undercover marketing by 
proscribing practices that deceive only the most savvy of 
consumers;129 however, the FTC’s protection is intended for all 
consumers, regardless of varied levels of intelligence, naivety, or 
skepticism.130 Judging by the efforts expended by undercover 
marketers to maintain their cover as average consumers, it is 
highly unlikely that consumers will take away the reasonable 
impression that they are conversing with paid actors.131 
                                                          
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. Flaherty explained, “[i]t just seemed to me like a nice, friendly 
encounter, and it kind of restores your faith in your fellow New Yorkers. And 
then, to find out it was all fake, it was just kind of, I don’t know—I don’t like, I 
don’t like the ring of it.” Id. 
128 Vranica, supra note 79 (quoting Gary Ruskin, executive director of 
consumer activist organization Commercial Alert). When told of the Sony 
campaign, Ruskin argued, “[i]t’s deceptive. People will be fooled into thinking 
this is honest buzz.” Id. 
129 Lewis, supra note 21, at 860 (explaining that the FTC’s protection is 
universal and intended for the gamut of American consumers). Lewis explains 
that the FTC is “the guardian of the ignorant, unthinking and credulous, the 
defender of ‘Mortimer Snerds’ and the protector of ‘wayfaring men, though 
fools.’ This victim of deception may not read all that he should, and may merely 
grab a general impression.” Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Vranica, supra note 79 (explaining that Sony has “gone to great lengths 
to train its actors to avoid detection”). Peter Groome, president of Omnicom 
Group Inc.’s Fathom Communications, explained, “[i]f you put [the actors] in a 
Sony Ericsson shirt, then people are going to be less likely to listen to them in a 
bar.” Id. 
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C. The Failure to Reveal That Undercover Operatives Are Paid 
Marketers Is a Material Omission 
The final requirement for finding a deceptive practice is that 
the omission be material.132 A material omission is one that is 
likely to affect the customer’s disposition toward the product being 
pitched.133 Undercover marketing clearly satisfies this final 
criterion, given that its ultimate goal is to favorably influence the 
customer’s attitude toward the product.134 If Sony did not believe 
that its stealth tactics would help to sell more camera phones or 
generate greater buzz about its product, it would have relied 
exclusively upon traditional advertising mechanisms to increase 
sales.135 However, companies such as Sony and Essential Reality 
are increasingly cognizant of the potential to increase profits 
through the use of interpersonal deception.136 As a result of the 
“fake tourist” campaign, Interference, Inc. reports that Sony 
realized a fifty-percent increase in sales in the markets in which the 
undercover marketing campaign was conducted.137 Marketers 
recognize the importance of protecting their operatives’ identities, 
and undercover marketing executives rarely divulge their client 
                                                          
132 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. 
133 Id. The Policy Statement explains that “[w]here the seller knew, or 
should have known, that an ordinary consumer would need omitted information 
to evaluate the product or service . . . materiality will be presumed because the 
manufacturer intended the . . . omission to have an effect.” Id. 
134 Steinberg, supra note 14. 
135 Maye, supra note 10 (noting that undercover marketers believe that 
undercover marketing tactics are necessary to reach savvy, young consumers 
who are unaffected by traditional advertising methods). 
136 BAKAN, supra note 15 (arguing that corporations have no problem 
deceiving consumers so long as they can benefit financially from the 
interaction); Steinberg, supra note 14 (quoting marketing executives who say 
that the trend in advertising must be to interpersonal communication and away 
from traditional media); Alyson Ward, Marketers Finding Sneaky New Ways to 
Pitch, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 17, 2002, at E1 (noting that 
marketers are learning that they have to reach out to consumers where they 
congregate, not just through a television set). 
137 Case study: Sony Ericsson, Interference Inc. Home, Case Studies, Sony 
Ericsson, at http://www.interferenceinc.com/sony.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2005). 
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lists for fear of confidentiality breaches that could blow open 
ongoing campaigns.138 
Undercover marketing operatives are not merely satisfied 
customers who wish to spread the joy they have found from using 
the product they are pitching. They instead are being paid to make 
the product look and sound as appealing as possible while posing 
as a typical consumer.139 The use of this tactic makes undercover 
marketing operatives endorsers by FTC standards because they are 
advancing an advertising message that consumers are likely to 
think is independent of the sponsoring marketer.140 When the 
omission is related to an endorsement, the FTC specifically 
mandates that any material connection between an endorser and 
the seller of the product be disclosed.141 Given that omissions 
relating to endorsements are considered material by the FTC, 
undercover marketing-specific endorsement omissions should 
receive due attention by the FTC. Marketers are required to 
disclose to consumers material connections between endorsers and 
sellers, and naturally, undercover marketing would be of no value 
if this connection were disclosed.142 Indeed, companies require that 
undercover operatives sign confidentiality agreements to ensure 
that the marketers do not reveal that they are being paid to promote 
the product.143 Customers deserve protection from these tactics 
because such material omissions offend contemporary notions of 
fairness,144 and more importantly, expressly violate FTC 
                                                          
138 Steinberg, supra note 14 (explaining that marketers are wary of naming 
names for fear of rendering the campaigns ineffective). 
139 Jim McBeth, Buying into the Virus, THE SCOTSMAN, Aug. 17, 2001, at 4 
(explaining that undercover marketing operatives should be approachable and 
not too good looking or obvious). 
140 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.0 (providing that “[t]he party 
whose opinions, beliefs, findings, or experience the [advertising] message 
appears to reflect will be called the endorser and may be an individual, 
group or institution”). 
141 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5. 
142 Id. 
143 BAKAN, supra note 15, at 134 (noting that undercover operatives are 
contractually bound to conceal their relationships by the companies that employ 
them). 
144 Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of 
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regulations.145 
In In the Matter of Cliffdale Associates, Inc.,146 the FTC, 
interpreting the FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and 
Testimonials in Advertising,147 opined that consumers are far more 
likely to rely on endorsements they believe to be “independent and 
unbiased” than those they know to be compensated.148 The FTC 
held that the company’s failure to disclose the relationship between 
itself and the endorsers materially affected the weight consumers 
gave to a particular endorsement.149 Because making a false claim 
of impartiality is material to consumers, such an omission is a 
deceptive practice under the Act and the FTC Guides.150 For the 
FTC, therefore, what matters is whether the consumer would have 
thought differently of the message had he known it was 
communicated by a paid employee.151 The agency’s holding in 
                                                          
Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. 
REV. 1 (1985) (arguing that fairness is the goal of advertising regulation). 
145 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39; FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 
255. 
146 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984). 
147 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at §§ 255.0-55.5. 
148 Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 O’Brien, supra note 26. See also FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 cmt. d (1977)). The 
Restatement explains that a material fact does not necessarily have to hinge on 
the finances of the transaction, stating that “there are many more-or-less 
sentimental considerations that the ordinary man regards as important.” The 
inclusion of this Comment in the FTC Policy Statement indicates that the FTC 
realizes that consumers are not solely concerned with the money they lose 
because of deceptive practices. Undercover marketing affects emotions as well 
in that one should be able to trust those with whom one interacts to be 
forthcoming about their purposes for the interaction. See also 60 Minutes, supra 
note 7 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell, author of THE TIPPING POINT). Of 
undercover marketing, Gladwell noted: 
Part of what makes real word-of-mouth so powerful is the 
understanding that we have . . . that the person telling us about it is 
telling us about it for . . . disinterested reasons. They’re not being paid 
by somebody. They have our interests at heart. That is worlds apart 
from a situation where the person telling us something is telling us that 
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Cliffdale has been consistently applied to subsequent FTC 
enforcement actions related to the failure of endorsers to reveal to 
consumers their material connections with marketers, and applies 
easily to undercover marketing.152 
III. UNDERCOVER MARKETING SHOULD BE REGULATED BY THE 
FTC, GIVEN ITS MARKED SIMILARITY TO INFOMERCIALS, WHICH 
ARE THE SUBJECTS OF HEAVY FTC SCRUTINY 
Since the 1990s, the FTC has strictly regulated deceptive 
practices in the “infomercial” industry.153 Infomercials take the 
form of full-length talk show programs (often enhanced by studio 
audiences) devoted exclusively to demonstrating the particular 
product being marketed.154 The product demonstrators and 
audience members endorsing the product in these programs appear 
to be objective and independent of the company selling the 
product.155 In light of the potential of these programs to confuse 
consumers, the FTC has found that infomercials violate the FTC 
Act’s proscriptions on deceptive practices when they are designed 
                                                          
because they have some private agenda. They’re getting paid. They’re 
being planted. 
Id. 
152 See, e.g., In the Matter of Melinda R. Sneed, 128 F.T.C. 322 (1999) 
(holding that the Sneeds’ failure to disclose that John Sneed, as an endorser, 
received a financial benefit from product sales was a deceptive practice in 
violation of the FTC Act because such a fact would materially affect the weight 
and credibility given by customers to the endorsement and would be material to 
customers in their decision to purchase the product); In the Matter of Taleigh 
Corp., 119 F.T.C. 835 (1995) (holding that Taleigh’s failure to disclose that 
endorsers of its diet pills were compensated was a deceptive practice in violation 
of the FTC Act because such a fact would be material to customers in making 
purchase decisions regarding the products). 
153 O’Brien, supra note 26 (citing several enforcement actions and 
explaining that “‘[i]nfomercials,’ which are program-length advertisements 
which frequently masquerade as talk shows, are quickly becoming a favorite 
target of the FTC”). According to the FTC, infomercials are advertisements 
“presented in the guise of a talk-show format.” FTC v. California Pacific 
Research, Inc., No. CV-N-88-602BRT, 1991 WL 208470, at *3 (D. Nev. 1991). 
154 Lewis, supra note 21, at 853. 
155 Id. at 869. 
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to look like independent television programs rather than paid 
commercial advertising, and thus, are likely to mislead 
consumers.156 Additionally, the FTC has found that the failure of 
infomercial sponsors to disclose that demonstrators and 
participants receive compensation from the sponsors constitutes a 
violation of the FTC Guides on Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising.157 The guides mandate disclosure of any material 
connection between an endorser and the sponsor company.158 
The FTC has instituted enforcement actions against several 
companies for broadcasting infomercials that are presented as 
independent television programs rather than paid commercial 
advertisements.159 In In re Twin Star Products,160 a highly 
publicized enforcement action, the FTC enjoined Twin Star from 
scripting its infomercials in a way that misled consumers into 
                                                          
156 See, e.g., In the Matter of Bogdana Corporation, 126 F.T.C. 37 (1998) 
(finding that Bogdana employed a deceptive format for its infomercials in 
violation of the FTC Act by expressly or impliedly representing that the 
infomercials were independent radio programs, not paid commercial 
advertising); In the Matter of Mega Systems International, Inc., 1998 FTC 
LEXIS 207 (finding that Mega Systems engaged in deceptive acts and practices 
in violation of the FTC Act by formatting its infomercials so as to resemble 
independent television programming, not paid commercial advertising); In the 
Matter of Nutrivida, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 339 (1998) (finding that Nutrivida made 
false and misleading representations in violation of the FTC Act by expressly or 
impliedly representing that its infomercials were independent television 
programs, not paid commercial advertising); In the Matter of Wyatt Marketing 
Corp. Inc., 118 F.T.C. 117 (1993) (finding that Wyatt’s infomercial format 
constituted a deceptive practice in violation of the FTC Act because it expressly 
or impliedly represented itself as an independent television program, not a paid 
commercial advertiser). 
157  In re Twin Star Prods. Inc., No. C 3307 (FTC Oct. 2, 1990) (decision 
and order) (enjoining Twin Star from further broadcasting its infomercials and 
from making deceptive claims about its paid endorsers); FTC Guides, supra note 
3, at § 255.5. 
158 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. See supra Part I.B (explaining the 
coverage of the FTC Guides). 
159 See supra note 156 for several examples of typical infomercial 
injunctions. 
160 In re Twin Star Prods. Inc., No. C 3307 (FTC Oct. 2, 1990) (decision 
and order). 
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believing that the broadcasted pieces were independent consumer 
programs.161 In particular, Twin Star deceptively represented that 
endorsers appearing on the program reflected “[t]ypical members 
of the public who . . . were independent from all entities marketing 
the product, when, in fact, the endorsers were its paid 
employees.”162 The FTC’s action against Twin Star indicates that 
the agency recognizes the danger inherent in fooling consumers 
into believing that they are hearing endorsements from purportedly 
objective consumers.163 
Undercover marketing is similarly problematic. Infomercials 
first attracted the attention of the FTC because of their deceptive 
format.164 Product demonstrators and audience members appeared 
to be extolling the benefits of products of their own accord.165 
Undercover marketing campaigns employ the same tactics, using 
seemingly objective and disinterested street operatives who are, in 
actuality, paid actors.166 Both infomercial sponsors and undercover 
marketers intend and strive to deceive customers to capture their 
audiences’ attention and market their products.167 In light of the 
parallel nature of these tactics, the FTC should similarly target 
undercover marketing for enforcement action, given that 
undercover marketing campaigns, much like infomercials, are 
deceptively structured so as to resemble otherwise objective 
interactions. 
The infomercial format developed when advertisers realized 
that while very few people would be inclined to sit and watch a 




164 O’Brien, supra note 26 (discussing the FTC’s penchant for strictly 
regulating infomercials). O’Brien explains, “So great are infomercials’ capacity 
to deceive that they have been described as the ‘seamy underside of the 
advertising business.’” Id. (citing Joanne Lipman, Infomercial Makers Try to 
Clean Up Their Act, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1991, at B3). 
165 See supra note 156 (citing examples of typical FTC enforcement actions 
based on the false independence of the demonstrators and audience members). 
166 Walking, Talking Stealth Ads, supra note 7. 
167 Lewis, supra note 21, at 871 (arguing that infomercial producers never 
intend clarity in their advertisements because of the need to make customers 
believe that they are watching an objective television program). 
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thirty-minute commercial, many more people would watch a 
thirty-minute commercial disguised as an objective talk show.168 
Similarly, undercover marketing developed when marketers 
realized that their target audience, resistant to traditional 
advertising, would be much more willing to listen to an average 
Joe or Jane than a paid spokesperson.169 Based on the FTC’s active 
regulation of infomercials,170 logic dictates that the FTC should be 
just as concerned with undercover marketing because, like 
infomercials, undercover marketing campaigns are premised on 
attempts to deceive consumers through the use of orchestrated 
endorsements.171 
IV. A CALL FOR ACTION BY THE FTC 
The FTC thus far has failed to seriously scrutinize undercover 
marketing practices. The public record is devoid of pending 
                                                          
168 Id. at 865. 
169 Maye, supra note 10 (explaining that undercover marketers believe that 
going undercover is the only way to reach consumers ages 12 to 34 who are “too 
savvy to fall for traditional advertising methods”). 
170 See supra note 156 for several examples of typical infomercial 
injunctions. 
171 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5 (stating that any material 
connection between an endorser and a seller of a product must be disclosed). 
This blanket rule applies to any marketing practice, regardless of form, so long 
as an endorsement is involved. On its official website, the FTC addresses 
infomercials in a section titled Frequently Asked Advertising Questions, warning 
potential infomercial sponsors that they should make sure not to “deceptively 
mimic the format of news reports, talk shows or other independent 
programming.” Further, recognizing that many infomercials contain 
endorsements, the FTC refers interested parties to the FTC Guides on 
Testimonials and Endorsements in Advertising, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ 
conline/pubs/buspubs/ad-faqs.htm. Although the FTC Guides do not specifically 
mention infomercials, it is clear that the rule is intended to cover all 
endorsements. Undercover marketing, like infomercials, utilizes endorsements 
and, as such, is subject to the FTC Guides governing endorsements. FTC 
Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.0-55.5. The FTC should, therefore, give 
undercover marketing the same attention it has given to infomercials, given the 
analogous nature of the practices. See Part III (discussing the similarities 
between infomercials and undercover marketing). 
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investigations of the practice, filings of individualized FTC 
complaints, or entries of enforcement orders against specific 
undercover marketers.172 However, undercover marketing 
undeniably is a deceptive practice under FTC standards,173 and 
therefore, the FTC should take affirmative measures to regulate 
this practice. 
Several policy reasons support the FTC’s regulation of 
undercover marketing. First, given the FTC’s broad power to 
regulate deceptive practices, the agency should not shy away from 
regulating undercover marketing simply because the practice is an 
innovative one.174 If the FTC fails to regulate such new 
technologies, the effectiveness of its regulation of deceptive 
practices will be severely diminished.175 Additionally, the FTC 
should act to regulate undercover marketers based on the 
increasing threat to consumer protection posed by the now-
blossoming use of undercover marketing campaigns by top 
corporations.176 Moreover, should undercover marketing tactics 
come to the attention of the public, consumer backlash might 
result; the FTC would be wise to anticipate this response and 
proactively protect the consumer market.177 Finally, undercover 
marketing creates a culture of deception that is antithetical to the 
mandate of the FTC, an agency created for the express purpose of 
ensuring fair and honest commercial practices.178 
A. The FTC’s Authority and Responsibility to Widen Its Scope 
of Investigation and Enforcement to Cover New 
Technologies, Including Undercover Marketing 
The FTC has a duty to act in the interest of the public and 
                                                          
172 Based on Westlaw and Lexis Nexis searches of FTC proceedings as of 
Apr. 19, 2005. 
173 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39; FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 
255. 
174 See infra Part IV.A. 
175 Id. 
176 See infra Part IV.B. 
177 See infra Part IV.C. 
178 See infra Part IV.D. 
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investigate deceptive acts and practices.179 Given the expanding 
budgets devoted to and the scope of undercover marketing 
campaigns, the FTC should act expeditiously to regulate this 
marketing technique.180 Currently, undercover marketing is 
primarily of interest only to journalists. Notably, articles on this 
marketing practice are devoid of any mention of FTC action.181 
Perhaps more telling, when interviewed on the subject, Jonathan 
Ressler, of Big Fat Promotions, Inc., reported that he has yet to 
hear from the FTC and does not expect to.182 
Although undercover marketing is significantly different in 
form from traditional print and broadcast advertising, the FTC 
should not retreat from regulating this marketing practice, 
particularly in light of the widespread criticism that undercover 
marketing has garnered from both consumer groups and 
advertising executives.183 In American Home Products v. Federal 
Trade Commission, the Supreme Court explained that the FTC 
must be able to expand the parameters of its enforcement to ensure 
that narrow investigatory or regulatory interpretations do not leave 
loopholes through which marketers may accomplish the prohibited 
                                                          
179 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1914). 
180 There are emerging signs of awareness of the practice at the FTC. In a 
New York Times Magazine interview, the assistant director of advertising 
practices at the FTC said of undercover marketing, “If [sic] testimonial is 
affiliated with you in some way, you have to disclose that.” However, the 
director would not comment on whether the practice was being investigated. 
Rutenberg, supra note 86. Another associate director for advertising practices at 
the FTC told the Wall Street Journal that undercover marketing “certainly raises 
ethical questions. At some point it raises legal questions. If a person in a bar 
makes claims about a product without revealing the fact that he is being paid to 
promote, you could well have FTC problems.” Steinberg, supra note 14. 
181 As of Apr. 19, 2005, all articles cited in and researched in preparation 
for this note fail to report any FTC proceedings against undercover marketers. 
182 John Heinzl, Advertising Slinks Undercover, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 
July 20, 2001. 
183 Heinzl, supra, note 106 (quoting Gary Ruskin, executive director of 
Commercial Alert, who explained that undercover marketing is the 
commercialization of human relationships); Rutenberg, supra note 86 (quoting 
Jeff Chester, a board member at the Center for Media Education, who called 
undercover marketers deceptive “commercial kamikazes”). 
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goal of deception.184 
Following this mandate, the FTC has continually widened its 
lens of investigation to cover new technologies.185 In In the Matter 
of All-State Industries of North Carolina, then-FTC Commissioner 
Philip Elman explained that the FTC retains jurisdiction over 
practices that may not have been thought of previously and has the 
duty of developing a body of unfair trade practices law that is 
“adapted to the diverse and changing needs of a complex and 
evolving competitive system.”186 Undercover marketing, if left 
unchecked, could severely diminish the effectiveness and bite of 
the FTC’s regulation of deceptive practices.187 Section 5 of the Act 
was drafted broadly for the specific purpose of giving the FTC the 
necessary flexibility to combat “new and improved” deceptive 
practices.188 Therefore, because the FTC is empowered to regulate 
this deceptive practice, the agency should investigate undercover 
marketing with vigor and resist justifying agency inaction by 
referencing the innovative nature of the practice. 
                                                          
184 American Home Products, 695 F.2d at 704. The Court explained, “[i]f 
the Commission is to attain the objectives Congress envisioned . . . it must be 
allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that its order may 
not be bypassed with impunity.” Id. 
185 Lewis Rose, Stealth Marketing (Interactive Marketing Under 
Government Scrutiny), MARKETING COMPUTERS, Apr. 1, 1995, at 20 (noting that 
the FTC has applied its traditional rules to developing technologies over the 
years, including print ads in 1914, radio ads in the 1920s, television ads in the 
1950s, infomercials in the 1980s, and 900 numbers and Internet scams in the 
1990s). 
186 In the Matter of All-State Industries of North Carolina, Inc., 75 F.T.C. 
465 (1969) (noting that the changing characteristics of the American 
marketplace forced the FTC to focus its attention upon deceptive practices 
associated with credit transactions). 
187 American Home Products, 695 F.2d at 704. As the Court recognized in 
American Home Products, the potential for innovation and craftiness in the 
marketing industry makes it essential that the FTC enforce its provisions from 
all angles. The Court pointed out, “[i]f the Commission is to attain the objectives 
Congress envisioned . . . it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the 
prohibited goal, so that its order may not be bypassed with impunity.” Id. 
188 See supra Part I (noting the generality of Section 5). 
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B. Undercover Marketing’s Rapid Growth and Popularity with 
Major Corporations Frustrates the Protection of 
Consumers 
Undercover marketing is no longer a grassroots practice.189 
Large, big-budget corporations, such as Microsoft, Kellogg, BMW, 
Apple, and Cadbury Schweppes PLC, are putting their advertising 
dollars into undercover marketing campaigns.190 Further, Big Fat 
Promotions Inc.’s profits increased fivefold in the first two years of 
the company’s existence.191 Clearly, undercover marketing is no 
longer a niche endeavor; however, one would be hard pressed to 
compile reliable estimates of corporate spending on undercover 
marketing, in part because companies resist admitting that they use 
stealth methods.192 Presumably, the more money spent on 
undercover marketing campaigns, the more consumers will be 
subjected to polished schemes, inevitably leading to widespread 
deception.193 Consumers are not the only ones falling prey to 
undercover marketers. Business owners frequently have no idea 
that their establishments are being used by undercover marketing 
operatives to push products; further, they are given no 
compensation in exchange for the use of their venues.194 As 
undercover marketers secretly pour greater amounts of money into 
                                                          
189 John Arlidge, The Way We Live Now: Too Good to be True, THE 
OBSERVER (London Edition), Aug. 12, 2001, at 6; Vranica, supra note 79. 
190 Arlidge, supra note 189; Vranica, supra note 79. 
191 Morgan Campbell, You Won’t Feel a Thing, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 7, 
2001, at D01. 
192 Eisenberg, supra note 80. 
193 Id. (explaining that “industry experts say that outlays for alternative 
campaigns are growing rapidly–and that Madison Avenue has little choice but to 
seek new ways to push products”). 
194 Jane Standley, Undercover Advertising Targets Consumers, BBC NEWS, 
August 17, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/ 1496213.stm 
(explaining that “the conversations struck up or the recommendations you 
overhear are selling not just talking and sometimes even the business owner 
doesn’t even know what is going on”). 
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more elaborate campaigns, they will soon have both unwitting 
consumers and business owners literally eating, drinking, and 
snapping photos out of their proverbial hands. 
C. Consumer Backlash: An Inevitable Consequence of 
Undercover Marketing in a Time of Tarnished 
Corporate Credibility 
Despite some undercover marketers’ hopeful outlook for the 
potential of undercover campaigns, as undercover marketing 
tactics are revealed to the general public, marketers run the risk of 
even further tarnishing corporate credibility in this age of corporate 
scandal.195 The FTC might determine that it is in the best interest 
of society and a well-functioning marketplace to preempt the 
spread of distrust that may balloon as undercover marketing tactics 
come to light.196 The fact that successful advertising industry 
leaders themselves have decried the tactics of undercover 
marketers should make clear to the FTC that undercover marketing 
is not only a questionable practice, but also a dangerous one for 
corporate goodwill.197 Some in the industry warn that backlash 
                                                          
195 Ritter, supra note 89 (arguing that undercover marketing could be bad 
for business overall, in that if advertising techniques become so deceptive, 
corporate credibility could take a hit and result in an overriding state of distrust 
of companies). 
196 See Harmon Leon, Secret Agents of Capitalism: Is That Hottie Really 
Flirting With You, or Is It Undercover Marketing?, METROACTIVE, May 12, 
2004, at http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/05.12.04/marketing-0420. 
html (imagining an “Orwellian . . . paranoid environment” resulting from 
undercover marketing, where interactions with others are made to be 
questioned). 
197 Vranica, supra note 79 (quoting David Lubars, president and creative 
director at Fallon Worldwide, a prominent advertising agency, who cautioned 
that marketers should be honest with customers in order to avoid a backlash in 
the future once undercover marketing strategies come to light). See also 
Eisenberg, supra note 80 (quoting Keith Reinhard, chairman of DDB 
Worldwide advertising agency, criticizing undercover marketing as “bad 
business”); Walking, Talking Stealth Ads, supra note 7 (quoting Scott Marticke, 
managing director of Atlanta’s Titan Advertising, who decried undercover 
marketing, saying, “[a]s it goes on, it will create a kind of disconnect, and 
people won’t know whom to trust”). 
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should be a real concern of undercover marketers.198 However, 
judging by the burgeoning number of corporations employing 
undercover marketers and the money being spent on these 
campaigns, it does not appear that advertisers are taking such 
warnings to heart.199 
A 2004 Marketing and Ethics News Poll conducted by CMO 
Magazine, a publication for chief marketing officers, indicates that 
marketing executives worry about the effects of unethical practices 
in business, especially in light of the recent scandals involving 
Enron and Martha Stewart.200 Seventy-three percent of those 
polled believe that increasing penalties for offenders is the best 
way to deter future unethical practices.201 The marketing 
executives also stated that deceptive sales and marketing practices 
were the top ethical issue facing their industry today, followed 
closely by dishonesty with customers.202 Furthermore, those polled 
viewed deceptive marketing practices as one of the top three 
                                                          
198 See, e.g., 60 Minutes, supra note 7 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell, author 
of THE TIPPING POINT). Of undercover marketing, Gladwell warned: 
My problem with undercover marketing is not what happens in the 
moment. It’s what happens in a week, or two weeks, or a month down 
the road, when we discover we’ve been duped. And I think that the 
moment when we discover we’ve been duped causes a backlash. 
Companies who engage in this practice are courting that backlash. And 
that’s a very, very dangerous thing to play with. 
Id. See, e.g., Rogier van Bakel, A Letter From the Editor: Big Fat Liars, 
ADVERTISING AGE’S CREATIVITY, Aug. 1, 2001, at 6. Van Bakel, editor of 
Advertising Age’s Creativity, warns that “[u]nlike flavored water poured over 
vodka, credibility and deceit never mix. You can’t build a brand without first 
building trust, and the fastest way to squander trust is to play people for 
suckers. . . .” Id. 
199 See supra Part IV.B (discussing the rapid growth of corporate budgets 
for undercover marketing campaigns). 
200 IDG’s CMO Magazine Reports the Untold Challenges, Evolving 
Pressures that Chief Marketing Officers Face, PRIMEZONE MEDIA NETWORK, 
Aug. 30, 2004, available at 2004 WL 91766902. 
201 CMO Marketing and Ethics News Poll, available at http://www. 
cmomagazine.com/ethics_poll/. 
202 Id. at 5. See, e.g., Vranica, supra note 79 (quoting a marketing executive 
who characterized undercover marketing as “reprehensible” and “desperate”). 
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ethical issues facing U.S. businesses generally.203 Perhaps this is 
because 44.6 percent of those polled admitted that they had 
witnessed someone in their company engage in or develop 
deceptive or misleading sales or promotion tactics.204 These 
numbers are telling. Marketing executives recognize that deceptive 
marketing practices pose a disturbing ethical dilemma and concede 
that regulatory enforcement and penalties would effectively deter 
such conduct.205 The FTC should take advantage of this corporate 
attitude by enacting regulations to rein in the use of these troubling 
and deceptive practices. 
D. Undercover Marketing Breeds an Atmosphere of Distrust 
and Skepticism 
Undercover marketing adds a new twist to advertising. 
Although traditional advertising makes use of persuasion or charm, 
it does not typically involve explicit trickery.206 Undercover 
marketers flagrantly deceive consumers, and they are not shy about 
it.207 One undercover marketer told the New York Times Magazine 
that his goal for each mission was simple: to subtly impart the 
sponsor’s message to consumers and “implant things about the 
product into their head.”208 One scholar argues that undercover 
marketing is distinguishable from most other types of advertising 
because it is based in artificiality.209 Consumers expect 
                                                          
203 CMO Marketing and Ethics News Poll, supra note 201. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Yvonne Cartwright, Undercover Marketing: Pitching You on the Sly, 
BELLINGHAM BUSINESS JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 2003, at B13 (discussing the opinion 
advanced by Malcolm Gladwell, author of THE TIPPING POINT, that undercover 
marketing is a bit of a con game). Gladwell’s statement highlights the point that 
traditional advertising tries to coax customers towards a certain product, while 
undercover marketing tries to hoodwink them. Id. 
207 Undercover Agencies, supra note 16 (quoting Jonathan Ressler, founder 
of Big Fat Promotions, Inc., who boasted that his operatives will never reveal 
their true agendas). 
208 Rutenberg, supra note 86. 
209 Thomas Nord, Stealth Marketing – Is it the Next Big Thing or Just a Big 
Fat Flop?, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Aug. 3, 2001, at 1C (quoting a professor of 
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commercials on television, but not in their local bars and hangouts. 
Companies such as Big Fat Promotions, Inc. and Interference, Inc. 
intentionally situate endorsers in places where people’s guards are 
down.210 
Jonathan Ressler of Big Fat Promotions, Inc. attempts to 
defend his practices by stating that the operatives are telling the 
truth about the positive attributes of the products they are 
promoting.211 However, courts have held that truthfulness within 
marketing will not save a message that is misleading overall.212 
Although the FTC mandates that endorsers reveal their connections 
to sponsor companies, undercover marketers avoid doing so at all 
costs.213 So long as the FTC continues to turn a blind eye to these 
deceptive practices, people may eventually become increasingly 
skeptical of one another’s motives. They may begin to ask 
themselves, “does this girl really want to have a drink with me or is 
she being paid by the gin company?” or “does my neighbor really 
prefer that brand of detergent or has she been hired to chat me up 
about it?” Undercover marketing creates a “sort of Truman Show 
situation where the world is full of ‘real people’ acting as your best 
mates when, in fact, they are paid brand spokesmen.”214 Such a 
state of distrust cannot be in the public’s best interest, which the 
                                                          
marketing at Indiana’s Kelley School of Business). 
210 Id. 
211 BAKAN, supra note 15, at 134 (explaining that Ressler is proud of his 
commitment to honesty in telling the truth about the products). See also 
Campbell, supra note 191 (quoting John Palumbo, chief strategy officer at Big 
Fat Promotions, Inc., who said that the practice is honest because the company 
only sends out operatives who use the products being hocked). 
212 Bockenstette, 134 F.2d at 371 (explaining that “words and sentences 
may be literally and technically true and yet be framed in such a setting as to 
mislead or deceive”). 
213 FTC Guides, supra note 3, at § 255.5; Campbell, supra note 191 
(quoting Jonathan Ressler of Big Fat Promotions, Inc., who explained that the 
company will not reveal its clients’ names). Ressler explained, “by naming them 
we render the whole promotion useless. The key here is confidentiality.” Id. 
214 Arlidge, supra note 189 (quoting Sean Pillot de Chenecey, a trends 
forecasting consultant who works for Saatchi & Saatchi, Weiden & Kennedy, 
and McCann Erickson). 
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FTC is empowered to promote.215 Kalle Lasn, the editor of 
Adbusters magazine, lamented the potential effect of undercover 
marketing on communities as a whole. She explained, “It is a form 
of cultural corruption at a time when advertising already pervades 
the landscape. It’s much more insidious because marketers are 
creating culture at the grassroots level, on the streets and where we 
live.”216 
Even children are being exploited by undercover marketers. 
Hasbro, a leading children’s toy company, recently recruited 1,600 
boys from Chicago, Illinois, ages eight to ten, and paid them to 
play a new handheld video game called “Pox” and to tell their 
friends about it.217 Sales of the game skyrocketed and Hasbro spent 
a fraction of what it would have on a traditional advertising 
campaign.218 Undercover marketing is invading the playground, 
the local watering hole, Times Square, and the laundromat, and can 
easily spread anywhere. In its Policy Statement, the FTC warned 
that the Commission “intends to enforce the FTC Act 
vigorously . . . [and] will investigate, and prosecute where 
appropriate, acts or practices that are deceptive.”219 The FTC must 
wholeheartedly combat undercover marketing if it truly intends to 
investigate and prosecute deceptive acts. 
CONCLUSION 
Although undercover marketing is unconventional and 
somewhat enigmatic,220 the FTC retains the power to continually 
                                                          
215 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1938) (empowering the FTC to initiate proceedings 
against individuals and companies using any unfair or deceptive practice in or 
affecting commerce if such proceeding is in the public interest). 
216 McBeth, supra note 139 (noting the observation of some critics that 
undercover marketing is sinister in nature). 
217 Id. (outlining the Hasbro campaign). 
218 Id. 
219 FTC Policy Statement, supra note 39. 
220 As compared to a television commercial, for example. While 
undercover marketing can take many forms in many different locales, 
commercial advertising is considerably standard. Television commercials do not 
command consumer interaction, while undercover marketers seek to engage 
consumers both physically and verbally. 
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expand its focus to keep pace with the evolution of the marketplace 
and to develop new enforcement priorities as times change.221 The 
FTC should heed the charge of Judge Learned Hand, who observed 
that the FTC’s duty is to “discover and make explicit those 
unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience of the 
community may progressively develop.”222 FTC investigations 
often serve as a vital means of gathering information for the 
issuance of new FTC policy statements or industry guides.223 
Therefore, even if the FTC is unsure at this stage whether 
undercover marketing practices demand individual prosecutions, 
the agency still can be proactive by providing undercover 
marketers with specific guidance as to the permissible bounds of 
their practices and by alerting them to the imposition of a more 
regulatory stance in the future.224 As illustrated by the Sony 
example, undercover marketing encapsulates all of the FTC criteria 
for deceptive practices and, as such, should be addressed by the 
FTC. However the FTC sees fit to best serve the public interest, it 
must act now before undercover marketing becomes so seamless 
that it is completely undetectable. 
                                                          
221 All-State Industries of North Carolina, Inc., 75 F.T.C. 465 (noting the 
expectation that the FTC will continually adapt its regulations to changing 
competitive systems). 
222 FTC v. Standard Education Society, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936), 
rev’d on other grounds, 302 U.S. 112 (1937). 
223 FTC Operating Manual, supra note 30, at ch. 3.1.3.4. 
224 Id. at ch. 8.3.3 (explaining that the FTC may issue an industry guide to 
address a specific practice in lieu of taking individualized enforcement action if 
such a guide might spur companies to proactively curb the practice in order to 
avoid FTC prosecution). However, the Operating Manual does caution that an 
industry guide would be inappropriate if there are indications that the violations 
are willful or wanton or if compliance with the standard of lawful conduct is 
unlikely to be attained without an enforcement action or creation of a 
substantive rule having binding effect. Id. at ch. 8.3.4. While an industry guide 
on undercover marketing may indicate in black and white that undercover 
marketing contravenes the FTC Act and the FTC Guides, undercover marketers 
seem intent on doing exactly what the FTC Guides prohibit, namely, refusing to 
disclose material connections between companies and endorsers. FTC Guides, 
supra note 3, at §255.5. Therefore, an industry guide may do little more than put 
a name to a practice that the FTC Act already prohibits. 
